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Resumen 
El presente documento analiza las debilidades de los protocolos relativos a los sistemas de votación 
por Internet, ya sean centralizados o descentralizados, como una tecnología utilizada en muchos 
países del mundo que puede aumentar significativamente el número de electores, ofrece 
transparencia, entrega de resultados y reduce la costos de todo el proceso electoral, permitiendo 
una forma auditable para el ciudadano y las entidades públicas. El uso de Sistemas de votación 
electrónica remota (REV) había abierto una nueva vía para los servicios de gobierno electrónico, 
brindando a la comunidad otras herramientas para fines electorales, y al mismo tiempo creó una 
larga lista de desafíos de valores que han permitido el desarrollo de nuevos sistemas de votación 
I, entre las comunidades que se centran en la investigación de diferentes maneras de minimizar los 
riesgos de este proceso. 
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Abstract 
The present document analyzes the weaknesses of the protocols regarding internet voting systems, 
either centralized or decentralized one, as a technology used for many countries around the world 
that may significantly increase the numbers of electors, offers transparency, delivery of results 
and reduces the costs of the whole electoral process, allowing an auditable way either for the 
citizen and public entities. The use of Remote Electronic Voting Systems (REV), had been 
opening a new way for e-government services, giving the community other tools for electoral 
purposes, and at the same time had create a long list of securities challenges which have allowed 
the development of new I-voting systems, among communities that focus on the research of 
different ways to minimize the risks of this process.  
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Introduction 
 
The constant growth and development of information technology in all fields of society 
have enabled a substantial improvement in activities related to the electronic government and the 
way in which the public sector connects with the citizens and improves its own services. 
 
Voting is the basis of any democratic system, either to elect representatives, to take 
decisions (referendum) or to reach a large-scale agreement. REV permits the voters to record a 
vote without having to be physically present in a supervise polling station, like traditional 
election do; instead of that, the citizens will have the possibility with the use of electronic 
devices like personal computers or smartphones connected to the internet, to record and transmit 
their votes during a specific time, set by the authorities of the election.  
 
The daily activities, the geography and the disposition of the resources used for 
traditional voting, make that in the majority of cases, the eligible citizens do not participate in 
the elections, which is harmful to democracy and in some cases, affect the results when not 
counting with the minimum number of participants, cases like Colombian referendum that was 
made in 2016, to approved or deny the negotiation between the government and the guerillas 
group known as FARC, to end a fifty years arm conflict had a 62% of abstention (Mundo), or in 
2016 the United Kingdom Brexit election, which decided if the country should remain or leave 
the European Union, had more than 28% of abstention as well. (Results, 2016) 
 
Most of the countries in the last decades have opted for government systems, where the 
legal age citizens making use of the vote, elects its rulers to represent them before the different 
instances of power (President, Congress, assembly, etc). Each nation has adopted its own 
mechanisms that allow an optimal, safe, fast and verifiable electoral process, for that reason we 
have seen the use of ballots, marking cards, color inks and electronic devices like DRE, among 
others many mechanisms that have marked the history of our countries. 
 
With the rise and massification of information and communication technologies, new 
forms have been developed in recent years to improve electoral processes, including internet 
voting, which has already been carried out in countries such as Estonia and Switzerland on a 
large scale, and some North American and Latin American cities as Santa Catarina Brazil and 
Santo Domingo de Los Colorados in Ecuador, as a pilot test. 
 
This paper discusses the weaknesses in centralized and decentralized internet voting 
protocols that will allow deepening in more robust security mechanisms for this type of 
technology, which has grown significantly in the last decade and will undoubtedly make the 
difference compared to traditional voting mechanisms. Also, analyze the cases of Estonia 2013 
election and de pilot election carry out by the Washington D.C. District in 2010.  
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I-voting is a technology where eligible citizens can vote using electronic devices such a 
laptop or smartphone, through internet connection, while ensuring privacy and integrity of the 
results in a way to improve accessibility, as well as alternative method to traditional on-site 
elections, without losing sight of the main fundamental objectives: 
 
 Ensure universal, free, equal, secret and direct vote. 
 
 Achieve greater citizen participation. 
 
 Ensure the transparency of the electoral process 
 
There are two types of internet voting: On-site, which is conducted at controlled places, 
where election officials can authenticate eligible voters and the electronic infrastructure that must 
be used. The second type allows voters to transmit their votes from any internet connection to 
which they have access using a computer or smartphone. 
 
When casting votes, the system gives a unique digital identification number (PIN) to the 
citizens that allow them to access the screens where the choice is made. Once the voter enters the 
site he can select the candidate of his preference and send the choice instantly. Voting is 
transmitted through a network of communications, either in a Centralized or decentralized 




All the voting protocols tend to meet the same set of security requirements, the privacy of 
all the voters is the principal security requirement, the result must be totally secret until the 
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election is completed and verifiable.  That provides the user the confidence that their votes had 
been treated correctly. 
 
Table 1.  General Security requirement for electronic voting protocols  
Security Requirement Description 
Privacy Is not revealed to anyone the way an eligible user voted 
Authentication of voter’s To ensure that only eligible voters can vote and only one vote per person is 
counted. 
Accuracy Valid votes cannot be removed or manipulated. No invalid votes can be added 
Secrecy of intermediate 
results 
All results are kept secret until the election is completed. 
No-coercion The system must not enable the selling of votes or the coercion of voters. 
Verifiability Voters must be assured of the correct treatment of their votes, and have means to 
irrefutably prove of any fraud. 
 
Features and functionalities of remote electronic voting system: 
 
For a basic understanding of what can be achieved with electronic voting systems, it is 
useful to consider the security and the end-user functionalities that these systems can offer for 
both voters and election officials. (Paper, 2011) 
 
Regarding legal principles, the system most meet the following requirements: 
 
- Universal: The voting system must be available for all eligible voters, without requiring 
special knowledge, and be easy to navigate, including graphics and sounds mechanism 
for people with disabilities. 
 
- Availability:  Must never enter an undefined state, and have a backup mechanism to 
recover the system in case of an emergency.  
 
- Free: Voters should make their choice without any interference or influence of anybody, 
as well they must not be paid or get paid for it. 
 
- Equal: Voters should authenticate themselves to prevent unauthorized access, and each 
person can only vote once, each ballot is counted exactly once within the result. All 
ballots have the same influence on the result. 
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Figure. 2: I-voting system overview 
 
Basic software components: 
 
 I-voting client application. This user-friendly application allows voters to cast i-votes from a 
wide range of platforms. It can be customized to support any kind of election. 
 
 I-voting system. It is comprised of a group of protected servers that collect, store, tabulate 
votes and create reports for election management. All these servers are controlled by the 
election commission. 
 
 I-voting verification application. Because every voter should be certain that their vote is 
counted as intended, this mobile app allows voters to confirm that their vote was registered 




The most common electronic schemes in centralized protocol required the uses of a very 
trusted counting server as a third party, which makes the security of this third party extremely 
critical for the voting system. 
 
The internet architecture for this protocol uses three layers (Web–Application-Database) 
on which the system executes an "applet” in the browser and establishes a secure connection 
(HTTPS) for authentication, selection of options and registration of the vote. 
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All the processing is controlled in a central location using a server to collect and save the 
ballots by a Serie of steps described in the following graphic. (OEA, 2014) 
 
 
Figure 4. Centralized Voting System 
    
Decentralized Protocol: 
 
One of the newest cryptographic decentralized voting protocols is the blockchain, which 
is a distributed database that maintains a continuously-growing list of 
ordered records called blocks. Each block contains a timestamp and a link to a previous block, by 
design blockchain are inherently resistant to modification of the data, once recorded, and the data 
in a block cannot be altered retroactively.  
 
A blockchain is an audit trail for a database which is managed by a network of computers 
where no single computer is responsible for storing or maintaining the database, and any 
computer may enter or leave this network at any time without jeopardizing the integrity or 
availability of the database. Any computer can rebuild the database from scratch by downloading 
the blockchain and processing the audit trail.  
 
The most obvious way to ensure that no single entity can manipulate the database is to 
make the database public, and allow anyone to store a redundant copy of the database. In this 
way, everyone can be assured that their copy of the database is intact, simply by comparing it 
with everyone else’s. (Followmyvote, n.d.) 
 
Taking in count that in a decentralized protocol there are no authorities or trusted parties 
– all voters operate independently with equal mutual suspicion. All traffic is performed on 
regular communication channels. The protocol is also accurate in that cheating is discovered 
immediately and in some cases, the perpetrator may be identified.  
 
The system used in DP based on blockchain offers a transparent public ledger which is a 
collection of accounting entries that is not centrally controlled by and individual or organization 
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and the ledger entries only get confirmed as correct and officially enter into the ledger once they 
have been mathematically verified by the blockchain. At the same time, the ledger is completely 
public. 
 
The most prominent concern about an implementation of Blockchain voting system is the 
lack of experimental evidence that such a system could hold up in a large-scale use, for example 
in a national election. Another important issue is regarding the use of cryptographic key in which 
a verified voter can cast their ballot, and in some cases, can be difficult to deal with this aspect as 
well making the attackers to compromising the voter’s key instead of the system. (Francesca 
Caiazzo, 2016) 
 
Blockchain uses security methods like asymmetric cryptographic keys, which are two 
types of keys, the first one is the public key that may be disseminated widely, and private key 
which is known only by the owner, this accomplishes two functions: Authentication when the 
public key is used to verify that a holder of the paired private cast the vote, and encryption, 
whereby only the holder of the paired private key can decrypt the message encrypted with the 
public key.   
 
When a legitimate user cast his vote, what the system does is broadcast a transaction to 
all the nodes that compromise the peer–to–peer network. 
 
 
Figure 5.  Blockchain Working Scheme. (Blockgeeks, n.d.) 
 
Giving that a variety of users are broadcasting the transaction to the network, the nodes 
must agree on exactly which transaction was broadcast and the order in which these transactions 
happened. This will result in a single, global ledger for the system. 
 
So, at any given point, all the nodes in the peer‐ to‐ peer network have a ledger 
consisting of a sequence of blocks, each containing a list of transactions, that they’ve reached 
consensus on (Arvind Narayanan, 2016) 
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Figure 6. Centralized and decentralized network. (https://followmyvote.com/, n.d.) 
 
 
Security Risk Analysis: 
  
Election   
 Authentication - There is not a physical probe that the person voting is really the 
authorized voter. 
- Possibility of stolen voter packages or identification cards 
- Misuse of elector's ID card and personal information voting by others 
without the knowledge of the elector 
Voting - Unable access to election website 
- Network Saturation 
- Internet signal cut off 
- Dissociation of the instructions for user verification 





- Internet signal cut off 
- Attacking the web application 
Storage - Hacker 
- Manipulation of the algorithm of the voting counting program in the 
server (The company that installed can decide also who win) 
- Replacement of the voting counting software 
Decryption - Remove or replace de cryptography parameters 
 
Threats In Centralized And Decentralized Protocol: 
 
Threat Centralized Protocol Decentralized Protocol 
Denial of Service Common Uncommon 




Automated vote buying High probability Low probability 
Insider attack on voting system Common Common 
Virus-specific to Internet voting system Common Common 
Spoofing High probability Low probability 
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Vulnerabilities In Centralized And Decentralized Protocol: 
 
 Centralized Protocol Decentralized Protocol 













as client PC or 
smartphone can be 
located in voter´s 
home, public or 
commercial places.  
 
These devices 
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Remote denial of service. 
The issue is triggered during 
the handling of a specially 
crafted signature alert. This 
may allow a remote attacker 
to cause a consumption of 
CPU or RAM resources, 









































Overflow condition.  
 
The program fails to 
properly sanitize user-




Comparative Specifications Between Centralized And Decentralized Protocols: 
   




Voter can verify if vote is cast as intended     
Voter can verify if the casting vote is recorded     
Voter can verify if votes are tallied as recorded     
Assurance on tallying integrity when TAs are all 
corrupted 
    
Suitable election (Small and large scale)     
Faster counting and tabulation    
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Greater accuracy in results    
Comfort for voters     
Increased participation in electoral process     
Costs       
Prevention of fraud     
Greater accessibility     
Communication in several languages     
Flexibility to make changes, handling deadlines    
Risk of manipulation by external agents     
Risk of manipulation by agents 
Internal 
   
Infrastructure      
Supplier dependency     
 
Estonia Internet Voting System Weaknesses: 
 
The 2013 Estonia local election used REV and there were identified many potential 
security risks, like malware on the client side machine, that monitors the user while placing his 
vote and then later changing the vote to a different candidate. Another weakness was regarding 
the HTTP. If a client sends a request containing unexpected header fields, the server logs the 
field names to disk, by sending many specially crafted requests containing fields with very long 
names, an attacker can exhaust the server’s log storage, after which it will fail to accept any new 
votes.  
 
Also, there was a vulnerability with the shell-injection in a server-side user interface that 
was intended to allow operators to perform pre-determined administrative tasks. The 
vulnerability would allow such an operator to execute arbitrary shell commands on the election 
servers with root privileges. 
 
The encrypted ballots are separated from the signatures and copied to an isolated machine 
before being decrypted and counted, an attacker who can smuggle this information out through a 
covert channel can compromise every voter’s secret ballot. 
 
The counting server malware can sort the encrypted ballots and leak the voter choices 
corresponding to each as a sequence of integers in the same order. 
 
Another possible risk has infected the server through malware being placed on the DVD´s 
used to set up the servers and transfer the votes. (Andrew Barnes) 
 
Estonia’s system also fails to provide compelling proof that election outcomes were 
correct. The tabulation process at the end of the election was also concerning, because after the 
votes were decrypted on the counting server, an unknown technical glitch prevented workers 
from writing the official counts and log files on a server DVD, and transfer them to a computer 
where they sign the results officially, instead the electoral authorities decided to use a regular 
personal USB to transfer those files, that might add a multiple potential attack vectors. (Drew 
Springall) 
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Figure 8.  Estonian Digital Voting System (Source: R. Verbij. "Dutch e-voting opportunities." Master thesis,  
University of Twente, 2014) 
 
Washington D.C. Internet Voting System Weaknesses: 
 
In 2010, Washington, D.C. developed and internet voting Pilot project that was intended 
to allow voters to cast their ballot using a website, prior to election the district made a public trial 
and invited to test the system or attempt to compromise its security, a team of student from the 
University of Michigan with Professor Alex Haldeman were able to break into the system and 
they found the next Vulnerabilities: (Scott Wolchok, Attacking The Washington, D.C. Internet 
Voting System, 2012) 
 
- Web Application:  The application was open source and it was possible for the team to 
hack the voter login, ballot, database communication, and network activity. 
- Shell-injection vulnerability. Was located in the code for encrypting voted ballots 
uploaded by users. 
- Network Infrastructure: Using Nmap’s OS it was possible for the team to access the 
router, the gateway and the network webcams and the terminal server. 
- Stealing Secrets: Retrieved several cryptographic secrets from the application server that 
includes the public key used for encrypting ballots, which allows attackers to substitute 
arbitrary ballots in place of actual cast ballots. 
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Figure 9.  Network Architecture – Washington D.C. Internet Voting System (Scott Wolchok, Attacking The 
Washington, D.C. Internet Voting System, 2012) 
 
Challenges Of Internet Voting Protocols. 
 
 Either for centralized or decentralize protocols, the identification of eligible voters is a 
great challenge, or it’s been solved using a unique voter id and digital signatures as well 
public and private keys. However, if the voter information is stolen, that person can place 
a legitim vote in that voter’s name. 
 The insecurity of the user’s device that could record a voter’s private key and pin, and 
then submits unauthorized votes in the client’s name. 
 In centralized protocol's the Vote Collection Server (VFS), and the vote counting 
machine presents the most attractive targets for adversaries since they must be connected 
to the internet and be exposed from all over the world. 
 Bugs in software either client or server side, that might expose voter’s ballots to the 
public and violate the secrecy. 
 Undetectability of attacks, in 2010 attack on Washington D.C system, researchers had 
full access to the central server for many days, before official discover their presence. 
(Wolchok S, 2012)    
 Raise consciousness in the community about the benefits and comfort of the internet use 
for electoral purposes, mainly to those related to security issues, ease of access and 
results delivery in less time than traditional ways. 
 
Future Perspective Of IVP. 
 
The most important gap found in traditional protocols system are those especially 
regarding security issues, and can be minimized by the use of the Blockchain technology, which 
had shown us the many uses like Cryptocurrency as the Bitcoin or Ethereum, where this kind of 
technology gives many benefits. 
 
1. Disintermediation and trustless Exchange: Two or more parties can make and 
exchange without the oversight or intermediation of a third party, reducing the 
counterparty risk, and generating more trust to those involved. 
 
For electoral purposes, this technology will help the voters to secure cast their votes and 
let everybody in the network know it, and will not need any other entity to validate it. 
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1. Empowered users: Users control of all their information and transaction 
2. High-quality data:  Blockchain data is complete, consistent, timely, accurate, and 
widely available. 
3. Durability, reliability, and longevity: Due to the decentralized networks, blockchain 
does not have a central point of failure and is better able to withstand malicious attacks. 
4. Process integrity: Users can trust that transactions will be executed exactly as the 
protocol commands removing the need for a trusted third party. 
5. Transparency and immutability:  Changes to public Blockchains are publicly viewable 
by all parties creating transparency, and all transactions are immutable, meaning they 
cannot be altered or deleted. 
6. Ecosystem simplification:  With all transactions being added to a single public ledger, it 
reduces the clutter and complications of multiple ledgers. 
7. Faster transactions: Traditional transactions can potentially take days for clearing and 
final settlement, especially. Blockchain transactions can reduce transaction times to 
minutes and are processed 24/7. 
8. Lower transaction costs: By eliminating third party intermediaries and overhead costs 
for exchanging assets, blockchains have the potential to greatly reduce transaction fees. 
(Deloitte) 
 
In a constantly growing society, the globalization and a strong democracy are the keys for 
an accurately use of Information technology and at the same time can lead us to better results on 
electoral process. Governments most implement new mechanism that increases the participation 
of electoral users, given results in less amount of time, as well offering to society security 




Since decentralized protocol, do not share a single copy in a specific server of the 
information, then there is no single entity that can manipulate the database, that allows the voters 
to store a redundant copy of this database and everyone can be assuring that their copy is intact 
by just comparing it to everyone else´s. 
 
In a DP, the nodes in the network use consensus mechanism, this might involve 
significant back-and-forth communication and/or deal with forks and their consequent rollbacks. 
While it's true that centralized protocols must also contend with conflicting and aborted 
transactions, these are far less likely where transactions are processed in a single location. 
 
Centralized Protocol process transactions once, in a decentralized one those must be 
processed independently by every node in the network, making that more work must be done for 
the same result. 
 
In CP two parties can make an exchange without the oversight or intermediation of a 
third party, strongly reducing or even eliminating counterparty risk. 
 
With all transactions being added to a single public ledger, it reduces the clutter and 
complications of multiple ledgers.  
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In CP, a single small mistake during the configuration or implementation of the voting 
server or its network infrastructure can compromise the legitimacy of the entire election  
 
By eliminating third party intermediaries and overhead costs for exchanging assets, DP 
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